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A STORY
Two young people who worked in service departments of the
Sydney Adventist Hospital were friendly-a little too friendly!
Presently the girl was noticeably pregnant, and this intelligence
was reported to Administration. What was to be done? We did
nothing-a favored administrative strategy. But pregnancies are
expansive. The circle of the informed and the concerned also
grew, and demands to do something became compelling.
A discipline committee decided the couple should leave, and
to my everlasting shame I accepted the decision. I did not, of
course, implement the decision. That was delegated to an officer of the personnel department. Delegation is another administrative strategy - not particularly suited to moral enterprise.
I did not know then that neither young person had anywhere
to go. They both came from broken homes. At one home they
were declared unwelcome, and the other no longer existed.
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The couple decided that together they wanted to make a go
of things because they loved each other. They consulted a church
pastor for help and requested marriage. He referred the matter
to the church board. The board decided they could be married
subject to formal censure, a measure which was designed to place
the church's position on premarital relations on record. The plan
was dropped because the young man did not want his partner
to receive or accept blame.
At this stage (I remain amazed) the couple returned to the
hospital. We have a beautiful little chapel, and they asked to be
married there. We granted their request, but imposed certain
restrictions. There was to be no confetti, no petals; the ceremony
had to be completed by a certain time. There were not to be
too many friends and guests. "We have no friends;' they said.
In the end our chaplains mustered a few staff members to witness
the ceremony. Can you have a wedding without guests? I suppose it defeats the main purpose, that of public declaration of
commitment.
For some time I received reports of the couple's progress.
There were three in the family now. They were struggling to
make ends meet, but otherwise they were doing well. Their love
endured.
It is a story that ended well. Was this because of, or in spite
of, our excursion into moral discipline? Might it not have concluded otherwise-with, say, a discreet abortion or, with so much
rejection on all sides, even a suicide?

Reflection on this incident lies behind a change in my thinking about the exercise of moral responsibility. It seems to me
now that self-interest was significant in my motivation:
• I had removed a source of offence and embarrassment, and
for those persons in the community whose major claim to piety
was the keeping of a watchful eye on others, a preoccupation.
You know how distracting things like this can be in institutional life.
• I was seen to act decisively. Opportunities for leadership to
demonstrate capacity of that sort are not to be lightly passed
over.
• I was seen to be a defender of standards. Nothing could be
more impressive in the setting of a religious community than
for a leader to appear assiduous in that role.
• My action therefore tended to enhance the image of leadership and to preserve the solidarity of the group-administration
bonanza!
My determinati~n was also highly idealistic:
• It reflected the world as I felt it ought to be. In an ill-defined
way I may have considered my action as a witness to that world
and therefore in some sense evangelistic.
• My action did not, however, account for the reality of the world
as it is . Virtue was taken for granted. There was no provision
for default.
• Most importantly, in the name of a higher cause my action
failed to address the clamant needs of the case at hand.
We can then construct two platforms or worlds of presupposition for ethical enterprise:
EGO/IDEAL
The first I shall call the world
of the ego/ideal.

ALTER/EXISTENT
The second is the world of the
alter/existent.

By ego I mean simply self.
By ideal I mean the highest
aim or good.

By alter I mean simply other.
By existent I mean life as it
is lived.

This is the abstract world of
ideas, values, interests and
beliefs.

This is the concrete world of
event, encounter, circumstance
and contingency.

This description is, of course, another illustration of the
Platonic dichotomy which has for so long plagued and corrupted
human thought: the division between idea, form and substance,
body and soul, mind, spirit and matter and so on. It runs through
philosophy and theology. So we have phenomena and noumena;
transcendent and immanent; realized eschatology, future
eschatology; kingdoms on the left, kingdoms on the right. (We
sometimes forget that the kingdom on the left, i.e., the
civil/secular, is God's also.) There are divisions of other kinds:
Bertrans Russell observed that human history has been determined by two great opposing forces; prudence and passion.
There are the distinctions between profession and practice, intention and action, and so on.
There is no need to enlarge on this vast dichotomy; it is inevitable and perhaps necessary in a broken world. St. Paul, with
his predilection for the broad canvas and flair for the master
stroke, foreshadowed that at the right time God would bring all
things together(1) .
The point we must make is that the whole of moral enterprise is necessarily grounded in another world falling between
and incorporating the two-the world of ambiguity:
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Dilemma
Ambiguity
Tension

Ego/Ideal

Alter/Existent

We use ambigu ity in the sense not only of two-sidedness bu
of the unclear, the problematic and the controversial. We are
speaking of a world of many shades of grey. It is the world of
dilemma and tension in which decision-making must take place.
For us, there can be no high moral ground, a platform on which
we decision-makers may stand either pretentiously or complacently. It is not that there is no right or wrong, no good or
bad, no criterion or standard. The problem is not in anything
around us. As we suggested in the beginning, the weakness lies
in ourselves.
In his book The Puzzles of Childhood (2) the celebrated
Australian historian Manning Clark paints a picture of his father,
a minister of religion, a man of impressive piety who professed
much. The son observed, however, that while the father fervently
preached forgiveness (a favorite topic) he could not forget. The
picture painted by the son is, in the words of one critic, that
of a man who was "all morality and no charity:' Sadly this is a
common contradiction.
My contention is that recognition of the ambiguity which pervades the human condition provides a key to strategy for moral
decision-making.
In any strategy that attempts to address problems in an ambiguous world there must be openness. We can and do have commitments. These must be combined with openness-openness
to the recognition of our biases.
Philip Wogaman, in his book A Christian Method of Moral Judgment, has pointed out that not only are our presuppositions (those
important points of departure) subject to bias, but every step
in the decision-making process:
the questions we ask
the methods we follow
the priorities we establish
the solutions we propose.
Complete detachment and objectivity are impossible (and
perhaps undesirable). The stronger our conviction the less likely
we are to be a fair judge of our impartiality.
continued on page 6
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The HIV ' Status of Health Professionals:
Do Patients Have a Right to Kno",?

Risk Transmissiorl of HIV
from Infected Clinician
to Susceptible Patients
By
Harvey A. Elder, M.D.
Epidemiology
Jerry Pettis Veterans Administration Hospital
Loma Linda, California
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THE STORY

An oral surgeon with AIDS extracted two molars under local
anesthesia in the fall of 1987 from a lady with no identified risk
(NIR) for AIDS. Four weeks later she had symptoms consistent with, but not classic for, primary HIV syndrome. By summer 1989 she had severe thrush, and AIDS developed by
December 1989. None recorded that she was exposed to the
surgeon's blood.(1) The surgeon conscientiously wore masks and
gloves for all patient contact. Judging from X-rays, the extractions should not have been complex. The surgeon acknowledged occasional needle stick injuries with local anesthetic
needles, but denied any since 1987.

II. BACKGROUND
HIV infection is difficult to acquire. There must be exposure
to HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. One million people infected
with HIV have become infected by exposure to the virus, but
not by the mere presence of infected people. For infection to
occur, the virus must enter tissue. Either HIV enters the blood
directly, i.e., IV drug users sharing needles, contaminated
needles, infected blood, and vertical transmission from an infected expectant mother to her fetus; or HIV enters indirectly
during sexual intercourse (heterosexual or homosexual) with an
infected partner. A person is most capable of transmitting HIV
early, while unaware of the incubating HIV infection and late,
during symptoms and physical impairment of AIDS.
Three factors tie this case of AIDS to the surgeon. 1. He had
a high titer of HIV at the time of surgery. 2. The patient had
no other identified risk factors (NIR). 3. Genetic sequences from

HIV of both individuals were closely related.(2) The arguments
against transmission from surgeon to patient are weak: emergence
of AIDS in only two years (a rare event) suggests that exposure
occurred before 1987, before she was seen by the surgeon. Three
years after surgery, investigators found no evidence documenting her exposure to his blood.
HIV has considerable genetic variability in certain parts of the
envelope gene. Epidemiological procedures developed to trace
HIV from donor to recipient have not yet been perfected. The
HIV envelope genes of this patient and dentist were quite similar;
thus the two HIV strains are of identical or nearly identical origin.
The argument for transmission from dentist to patient rests upon
these data.
Centers for Disease Control released data, however incomplete, not because the data proved transmission but because
it may be significant. This preliminary report allowed people to
choose their response. The report informs but does not state
a CDC position. It is not a mandate "to do something:'

III. GENETIC SEQUENCE STUDIES:
1. Viral isolates from different individuals, or the same individual at different times, have markedly different genetic sequences.(3) However, recent reports(4 ,S) suggest that even different HIV strains may have similar genetic sequences. To date
only a few investigators have studied HIV genetic sequences(6)
and the database(7) is limited. Only four epidemiologic studies
of HIV genetic sequence exist. (8)
I tentatively accept the genetic epidemiologic data that the
HIV from patient and surgeon are from a single source. Prior
to confirmation and documentation of the epidemiologic value
of HIV genetic sequencing I recognize that the theory may be
wrong: HIV genetic sequences may not be as diverse and may
not be suitable for epidemiologic study. Also, these procedures
in early stages of development are not standardized and may have
technical problems, i.e., the reagents may be contaminated or
the sequential analysis may be flawed.(9)
IV. WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM STUDIES OF
HEPATITIS B TRANSMISSION FROM HBV INFECTED HCW AND PATIENTS:
This report is the first suggestion of HIV transmission from
HCW (health-care worker) to patient. In contrast to HIV, HBV
(Hepatitis B, a blood-borne virus) is easily transferred from
surgeon (or other HCW) to patient under the following
circumstances(1 0):
1. The HCW has a high titer of HBV (HBeAg+). Surgeons
with low titer (HBeAg-) do not occupationally transfer HIV.(11)
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2. A means exists for HBV to leave the health-care worker,
transfer to and enter the patient.
HIV transfer from surgeon (or any HCW) to patient is far less
efficient than HBV and probably less frequent. Transfer of HBV
from infected surgeon to patient is nearly zero (one case reported)
if precautions are used.(12) Best guess estimates that one to two
percent of HCW with frequent patient blood contact, are HBV
infected and able to transmit infection to patients. In the ten
years from 1979 to 1989, 200 cases of hepatitis B are so transmitted. These data suggest that occupational transmission of HIV
(which is less efficiently transmitted) from surgeons (or other
HCW) to patients will be infrequent and that the risk is low.

y. WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT HIV TRANSFER
FROM HeW TO PATIENTS:
Some surgical procedures are performed by feel manipulation
of needles and other scalpels, not under direct visualization. During these operations, surgeons direct their needle or scalpel by
"feel:' Because surgeons performing these procedures frequently stick or nick their fingers, or otherwise draw their blood, these
are "high risk procedures:'(13) Some procedures (non-invasive)
are closed, the skin is never broken.
To date, 4,500 patients operated on by HIV infected surgeons
have been reviewed with no evidence of surgeon transfer to patient.(14,15,16,17) Rhame estimates that HIV transmission from
surgeon to patient occurs with a frequency between one per
100,000 and one per 1,000,000 operations.(18)
Likelihood of occupationally acquired HIV infection after needle stick or other such exposure is less than 1I100th that of
HBY.(19,20) 1. The HIV-infected HCW are much less likely to
transmit their virus to their patients than HBV-infected HCW
(probably by a 100-fold factor). 2. Fewer HCW have HIV infection (about 5,000) than HBV (about 50,000). 3. Transmission
of HBV from HCV to patient is 100 times more likely than HIY.
Hepatitis B kills one percent acutely and an additional five percent during the next ten years, i.e., a total of 6 percent will die
from Hepatitis B during the first ten years after infection. The
larger number of HBV-infected HCW and the higher transmission rate show why 100 to 300 times more patients acquire HBV
as HIV from HCW. Assuming that HIV infection is 100 percent fatal, and that HBV 6 percent, then for every HCWtransmitted HIV (and death), 6 to 12 patients die of HCWtransmitted HBY. The risk of AIDS acquired from a HCW is
less than the risk of death from HBV acquired from a HCW.
Likelihood of patient-acquired HIV infection from infected
health-care workers is probably less than that of occupationally
acquired HIV infection by health-care workers. This conclusion
is based on the following: 1. the number of HIV-infected patients is high (over 1,000,000), while the number of HIV-infected
health-care workers is low (about 5,000). 2. HIV-infected patients seek health care when their virus titer is high and they
are most infectious. Health-care workers stop working because
they are symptomatic as their HIV titer rises and they become
more infectious. Though more than 25 HCW have occupationally acquired AIDS, this is the first possible case of occupational
HIV transmission from HCW to patient. The risk appears to
be low. This is an infrequent event occurring about once in over
150,000 cases of AIDS.
Y.

SUMMARY:

A patient, without identified risks for HIV, has AIDS. Her
HIV has many genetic sequences in common with those of her
dentist who extracted two molars about two years prior to her
AIDS. The genetic sequence data are suggestive, but not now
4

conclusive. The patient could have acquired HIV from the needle used for local anesthesia prior to oral surgery.
Data from HBV studies suggest that very few HCW ever
transfer HBV to a patient. HCW with very high virus concen
trations do not transfer HBV when they follow universal precautions [with only one exception(21»). Present data strongly suggest that HIV will spread far less easily from HCW to patients
than HBY. If this is a case of occupational HIV transfer from
HCW to patient, it is the first in over 150,000 cases of AIDS.
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We will try to answer this question by looking first at public
opinion, then at the stance of the medical profession, and
finally, at the ethical issues involved .
In a 1987 Gallup poll of 1,000 adults, 86 percent believed that
the patient should be told if a physician has AIDS. Eighty percent felt that all health-care workers should be screened for HIV
antibodies, and 57 percent believed that HIV positive healthcare workers should be denied the right to practice.
In a 1988 poll of 2,000 adults, Gerbert found that 80 percent
believed that physicians should inform their patients of their HIV
status, and 56 percent would switch physicians if theirs was HIVpositive. In addition, 32 percent believe that physicians should
inform their patients if they are providing care for HIV patients
in their practice, and 25 percent would switch if they learned
this information.
It seems clear from these two polls of public opinion that the
public believes patients have a right to know the HIV status of
health-care workers.
In 1988 the AMA stated: ''A physician who knows that he or
she is seropositive should not engage in any activity that creates
a risk of transmission of the disease to others:' This was before
the tragic case of Kimberly Bergalis became public knowledge.
In light of that case, and since the AMA did not define "any
activity" or "a risk;' this would appear to be a concrete statement by the medical profession prohibiting HIV-positive physicians from practicing.
In considering the ethical issues involved in this question, we
will discuss issues of consent, rights and risks.
Valid consent is the clinical concept that a competent patient
must be given adequate information before he or she agrees to
a particular intervention, and must not be subject to coercion
in the decision. While most physicians, ethicists and attorneys
agree on this concept, there is not clear agreement on what constitutes "adequate information:'
The legal doctrine of informed consent has been around for
about seventy years. Until 1972, all courts ruled that the standard for determining what was adequate information was the
"reasonable physician" standard. That is, a physician must tell
his or her patient what any reasonable physician would disclose.
In J972 an appellate court introduced a new standard which has
been adopted by several jurisdictions, including California. The
new standard is the "reasonable patient" standard ; i.e., a physician must tell his or her patients what any reasonable patient
vould want to know. This shifts the focus from the physician's
duty to the patient's rights.
The public says it has the right to know the health-care
worker's HIV status. If we accept this as public policy, does this

mean that the public also has the right to know the health-care
worker's transfusion history (how many units; what year; were
the donors screened for HIV antibody?), or history of intravenous
drug abuse (when , where, shared needles), or their sexual practices? May the patient say to the surgeon: "Since you will be
removing my gallbladder tomorrow, I would like to know how
many times in the past six months you have had anal receptive
intercourse" ?
Health-care workers are people too. They also have rights.
They have the right to privacy. Courts have said that people who
are HIV positive (presumably including health-care workers) have
the right to non-discrimination in work, insurance and housing.
It should be pointed out that an asymptomatic HIV-positive
status does not qualify a health-care worker to receive disability
insurance benefits. Being ill with AIDS, on the other hand, may
result in benefits.
The third issue that enters into our ethical analysis is the matter
of risk. The adequate information that must be discussed before
valid consent may be obtained includes a discussion of risk. For
any proposed intervention, there are at least three elements to
the risk: (a) the risk inherent in the intervention itself, (b) the
degree that this procedural risk is modified by the condition of
the patient, and (c) the degree that the procedural risk is modified
by the operator. For example, a given operation may have a risk
of death of 1 percent, but if the patient is in poor condition,
the risk for him may be 5 percent or even higher. Likewise, if
the surgeon has never performed this operation before, or is
himself at risk of having a heart attack or a seizure during performance of the surgery, the patient's risk may be higher than
the 1 percent procedural risk. Procedural risks and patient risks
are usually recognized and discussed with patients during the
consent process. Operator risks are less often recognized , and
are even less often discussed.
Operator risks include inexperience, impairment and illness.
Impairment (e.g., by substance abuse, emotional disorder, effects of aging) are different in that there is usually an element
of denial on the part of the impaired health-care worker. The
impairment is usually recognized by someone else first, and the
impaired person must be confronted. Illness, on the other hand,
is usually recognized by the health-care worker first. Illness that
may increase patient risk includes such things as hepatitis B,
tuberculosis, methicillin-resistant staphylococcal colonization,
unstable coronary artery disease, uncontrolled seizures, tremor,
and HIV-positivity. Operator risk may even be influenced by lack
of sleep or distraction by family or other stresses.
When does a risk become significant? Traditionally in medicine
we try to assess both the severity and probability in determining significance. For example, if a drug used during a procedure
has a 1 in 50 chance of causing a transient rash that doesn't even
itch, that would likely not be considered a significant risk that
needs to be discussed with the patient beforehand. On the other
hand, if the procedure has a 1 in 500 chance of causing the patient's death, it would be very significant, even though less likely.
Is the risk of transmission of the HIV virus from a health-care
worker to a patient significant? Certainly the severity is very high,
approaching 100 percent mortality. Most likely everyone who
contracts the virus will eventually develop AIDS, and , with the
current state of the art, everyone with AIDS will die. The probability, on the other hand, approaches zero, but as Kimberly
Bergalis has taught us, is not equal to zero. Estimates of the
probability of transfer of the virus from surgeon to patient range
continued on page 7
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continued from page 2

For those of us who have religious commitments, it is important to recognize that understanding of what it means to be true
to Scripture has also undergone considerable development. We
remain persuaded that Scripture does speak to our time, but how?
How do we move from the historic witness to discover God's
will for the present, or from the present to find His will in the
historic witness?
Of the numerous models which have been elaborated for the
use of Scripture in ethics, two seem especially helpful:
The formation of character model (B. C. Birch and L. L.
Rasmussen). The concept here is that our faith through its
stories, images and symbols conditions our perceptions and commends certain values. Internalization of these values and the images and symbols that go with them shapes our attitudes and
intentions and in turn our pattern of response. Ultimately these
dominant values determine our priorities and inform our
decisions:
FAITH
(stories, images, symbols)
perceptions, values
attitudes, intentions, character
disposition
decision
ACTION

nurtured unrealistic expectations, thereby undermining acceptance of greater individual responsibility for health. This is one
of the criticisms of modern medical practice.
It is likewise difficult for a Christian who fervently believe
in the all-sufficiency of his faith to accept that one may not have
answers to some questions, or that one's recommendations may
not be accorded the priority they seem to deserve. In matters
of faith, too, unrealistic expectations may undermine acceptance
of responsibility.
I was impressed with this when exploring the possibilities for
response to the AIDS problem with a group of church and community representatives in New South Wales.
To the church group the solution seemed so obvious: immediate return to the principle of fidelity. Exclusive permanent
heterosexual union was the complete answer, and this was the
propitious time for it. The group was incredulous when others,
one of whom was a leading judicial figure, seemed unimpressed. Confidence in the prospect of a universal mass reform
movement of this kind is unrealistic-to the point of naivete. And
we can be naive.
The question is therefore, what do we do now? The ideal cannot be realized, the infection continues to spread, and the
numbers of sufferers continues to grow everywhere. Can we support simple interim measures to control transmission-safer sexual practices and syringe exchange programs? Can we still accept responsibility?

There is, according to this thesis, an inextricable relationship
between the ethics of being and the ethics of doing. There is
consistency between the good person and the right action.
The moral principle model (A. von Harnack) proposes that the
most fitting application of Scripture in ethics is at the level of
moral principle. Certain general principles may be discerned in
our foundation sources which can be applied to a variety of concrete situations:

To proclaim an absolute ideal and proffer nothing
else to those unable to attain the absolute is a denial
of charity, an abdication of ethical responsibility and
an exercise in Pharisaic elitism. .. In a broken
world, second best is better than none. .. J.
McPherson, Ed. Aids and Compassion, Canberra, St.
Marks. 1988(4).

PRINCIPLES
guidance
rules, codes, imperatives
decision
ACTION

The respected John Howard Yoder, in his book The Politics of
Jesus(S) , makes the radical suggestion that participation in the
suffering of Christ (i.e., the taking up of one's cross) does not
mean simply the denial of a selfish way of life. It means quite
specifically the abandonment of legitimate ends if they cannot
be achieved by legitimate means. I make a further proposal
(which Yoder declined to make) that following in the way of Christ
may sometimes mean the giving up of the most legitimate means
in favor of a worthy end. This is particularly important in the
context of human welfare and the saving of life. I am inclined
in such circumstances to support Fletcher, who argues, if from
a different standpoint, that "Any disvalue in the means must be
outweighed by value gained in the end"(6).
In an ambiguous world, an interim ethic may be necessary
if we cannot achieve finality. We must continue to care when
we cannot be correct (by being correct I mean conforming to
a code or standard-personal, professional or religious).
To continue to care when we cannot be correct is an immense
challenge. Our natural reaction under those circumstances is to
withdraw, to dissociate ourselves from compromise.
A patient in our hospital had developed an acute postoperative
complication. His own surgeon could not be contacted. I requested another visiting surgeon in the hospital at the time to
see the patient. To my surprise he declined, declaring that on
ethical grounds he could not see another doctor's patient withou'
a direct request from him. (It is true that referral by formal notict-.
is entrenched in Australian medical protocol.) The doctor was
correct, very correct, but did he really care?

This is not to say that Scripture may not provide more specific
direction. At the lower levels in this functional hierarchy, however,
cultural factors and circumstances of time and place become increasingly influential. This is where problems of interpretation
can be very difficult.
The strength of these approaches is that they do justice to
persons as intelligent and free moral agents. To speak of ethics
and morals without agency or freedom is a contradiction. These
models are also responsive to the need for Christian ethics to
address ever-changing situations. They do not, however, remove
from us the inconvenience of having to work out how to be Christian in the late twentieth century, and they do call on us to expose our accepted patterns of response to examination and to
change them if necessary. (see box on page 7)
Of course, not all will agree with our choice of model or principle or that we have applied them appropriately. This should
not disturb us. Scripture is rich in its diversity. Certainly differences should not divide us. It is more important to preserve
our agency and to cherish our freedom . We must remain open.
An interim ethic may be necessary, if finality cannot be achieved.
It is difficult for a medical practitioner to admit on occasion that
little can be done-so much is expected. We have sometimes
6

Application of Principles to Some Contemporary Ethical Problems
PROBLEM

GUILDING PRINCIPLES

RESOLUTION

Life support
Organ transfer

reverence for life (creation)
acceptance of temporarily (fall)
privileged place of the body in
acts of love
(incarnation, eucharist, passion)

Animal welfare/
experimentation

cultural mandate (domination,
stewardship)

optimum rather than maximum
support
giving and receiving
taking and getting
selling and buying
respect and responsibility for all
(sentient) life

Status of women

equality, complementarity (creation, justification)

In the earlier years of the AIDS epidemic there was a reluctance among many health-care professionals and agencies to accept and to admit seropositive patients. Fear was a factor, but
there was also disagreement with health authority policy on confidentiality and testing, and there was distaste for the perceivedly
less-than-correct circumstances under which many patients contracted the infection. There is also a wider movement, admittedly a strongly opposed one, to restrict therapeutic options in
the ca~e of self-inflicted illness, illness resulting from, for example, self-indulgent lifestyles. The employment of a culpability
index has been suggested for this purpose. Where would one
stop?
If we have come to terms with the ambiguity in the world (an
ambiguity in which we ourselves participate) we will continue
to care whatever the circumstances. This is what I think of as
world responsibility. It is the reverse side of the coin of world
evangelism.
The concept "world responsibility" implies an
awareness that the world is in sin and will remain
in sin for the time being. It implies that the community of believers is unable to abandon it in spite
of that unalterable fact. It implies that the community is called upon to participate in God's determination to assume responsibility; for the world, to suffer its present state, ... to keep the doors open for
a total renewal at all times. (Nurnberger. Theological
Ethics, UNISA. 1980.) (7).
I further suggest that responsibility must take precedence over
evangelism.
I have referred to a change in my thinking. What would this
change mean in terms of our original story-if I had a second
chance?
I think I would call the couple involved, perhaps even call on
them. I would tell them that I had learned a little of what had
happened and that I was anxious to help in any way. When I
discovered that they wished to keep the baby I would tell them
how pleased I was about that. I would ask more about their plans.
When I learned that they wished to marry I would discreetly
try to prepare the ground for them. I would consult the minister
of the church of their choice and ask him, in the name of the
Sydney Adventist Hopsital, to be helpful. I would explain what
I knew of the background to the situation and what the hospital
was prepared to do. I would indicate to the couple that they would
be welcome to continue work at the institution. We would offer
' 1b security for the mother, who would need some leave of
absence. When I learned that they had few friends, I would assure
them that we, the administration and staff, were all their friends.
I would ask about their accommodation and needs and assure

all forms of discrimination are
cultural only

them that any reasonable help that could be afforded would be
given. I would ask them to report to me again. '
All of this would cost the hospital very little. It would, however,
go beyond a commitment to world evangelism to' acceptance of
world responsibility, to a keeping of the doors open until the
time when, in Paul's words, "God will bring all things together"(1).
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from 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 1,000,000. And that number is greatly
influenced by the stage of the disease in the health-care worker,
and by the invasiveness of the intervention.
Prior to this first case of probable transmission from health
care worker to patient, the CDC had said that HIV-positive
health-care workers should refrain from patient contact if they
had exudative skin lesions, and should use barrier protection of
the patient if they were engaged in invasive procedures. They
defined invasive procedures as surgical entry into tissues, cavities
or organs; care of major traumatic injuries, cardiac catheterization or angiographic procedures; vaginal or caesarean delivery;
manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral lesions;
or other procedures in which bleeding may occur.
The Bergalis case suggests that currently recommended barriers are not sufficient protection. The CDC is reassessing its
position on barriers and/or prohibition of HIV-positive healthcare workers from certain clinical situations.
This significance of risk that we have been discussing is the
medical profession's assessment of risk. The courts have said
that the reasonable patient's assessment is what counts. Courts
define "material risk" as a risk that would make a difference to
the patient. The polls cited earlier indicate that a majority of
the public considers the HIV status of the health-care worker
to be "material" information in that they would switch to another
health caretaker if they knew their doctor was HIV-positive.
What might be the consequences of a public policy that states
a patient has a "right to know" the health-care worker's HIV
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status? As would be predicted from the poll results, and as has
been experienced by a few physicians whose HIV status became
public knowledge, their practices would disappear overnight.
Most patients would no longer seek medical care from someone
they perceived as a danger to them.
A second consequence would be a very rapid move to demand
mandatory testing of all health-care workers. If the patient has
a right to know, the profession will be forced to make known.
Since the test for HIV antibodies is not 100 percent reliable,
this would generate both false positives and false negatives. A
person without life-style risk factors for HIV-positivity has a
greater chance of having a false positive HIV test than a true
positive. False positives have caused divorces and have resulted
in suicides. People who test negative although infected, on the
other hand, will have a false sense of security and may, in fact,
expose others unknowingly because they might be less inclined
to use barrier precautions than if unaware of their HIV status.
A third consequence of such a right to know would be a fur-

ther drift of the patient-physician relationship toward an adversarial one.
As a patient advocate, I concur with the legal doctrine that
states a physician has a duty to warn patients of significant risks(
As an advocate of the traditional patient-physician relationship,
I believe the profession should determine when a risk becomes
significiant.
In conclusion, the patient has a right to protection from significant risk of transmission of the HIV virus. The known HIVpositive health-care worker has a duty either to inform a patient
of this when he or she will perform an invasive procedure, or
to refrain from doing invasive procedures. A health-care worker
who performs invasive procedures does not have a duty to be
HIV tested unless he or she is at risk.
Good ethics begins with good facts. As the facts of HIV disease
change, the ethical analysis of these questions should be
re-evaluated. •

Health-Care Professionals
With Aids:
A Patient's Right to Know?

The court, in discussing this reasonable patient standard, affirmed the duty to disclose to the patient known risks of death
or serious bodily harm. With basic assumptions that 1) the physician knows that he or she is HIV-positive, and 2) transmission
from the health-care provider to the patient is possible, I predict
that a California court will decide that risk of death from HIV
communication from the physician is significant, and the patient
must be informed. Once that patient is informed, if he or she
still chooses to undergo treatment by that physician or healthcare provider, that would be effective informed consent.
The opposite argument, the one made in favor of the Florida
dentist in the Kimberly Bergalis story, was that if the dentist hal
told his patients he was HIV-positive, he would be out ot
business, he would lose his practice. As your lawyer I would never
make that argument because it is one of avarice. How am I going to eat? How am I going to pay my bills once I'm out of practice because of an HIV- positive finding? That argument isn't
going far with a jury and a judge who will apply the reasonable
patient standard. You are not going to get a jury of physicians;
you're going to get twelve folks, good and true, from the local
community, and they're going to be asked to decide what the
reasonable person would have wanted to know under those
circumstances.
In conclusion, it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to decide whether he or she wants to undergo a given procedure. In making that decision, under California law, the patient has a right to know all relevant perils known to the physician. Do you have to give a four-year course in medicine? Of
course not. But a jury is going to be asked how much the physician should have told the patient, and I think Dr. Elder is absolutely correct when he says that with a known risk of transmission the health-care provider in California will be negligent if
he or she does not provide that information to the patient in
advance of an invasive procedure. •

By
Thomas S. Hudspeth, ID.
Co-Chair, Medical Legal Committee
of San Bernardino County
A couple of years ago Dr. Jack Provonsha speaking on Ethics
and Law, stood for the proposition that good ethics done in a
timely fashion creates good laws. I will tell you that courts, in
my never humble opinion, do not make laws that result in the
practice of good medicine that result in good ethics. What they
are doing is responding to a lack of ethical decisions as they
perceive them in the medical world.
On this issue of informed consent and the HIV-positive physician, I can tell you where California law will make its decision.
I'll also report that California leads the nation medically in studies
of this condition and legally in deciding what to do about it.
The leading informed-consent case in California is Cobbs vs.
Grant. The California Supreme Court was the first in the nation
to reject the reasonable physician standard and adapt the
reasonable patient standard. What would a patient want to know
before undergoing a given procedure? A majority of health-care
providers say that they would want to know of an HIV-positive
finding in a health-care professional. If a health-care professonal
would want that, what do you suppose the general public would
want?
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